3P Security GroupPrevent · Protect · Preserve
Sample for a fictional church.The church, the site and every finding on this page are made up.

Sample NSGP assessment

A church vulnerability assessment, from the site walk to proposed projects.

Juniper Lantern FellowshipFictional Dallas church · Prepared October 20, 2026

Explore the site plan

What to fix first

Fix the open lobby entry and the shared children's door first, then sort out the shared keys. The score sets the order of work.

  1. F01Entry stays openUrgent · score 20
  2. F02Children’s door is sharedUrgent · score 20
  3. F09Keys lack a registerUrgent · score 20

Site plan

Tap a numbered pin to see what we found there and what we recommend.

Fictional church site planSchematic of parking, service yard, worship hall, lobby, children’s wing and office. Twelve numbered links locate the sample findings. Not to scale.NParkingService yardWorship hallChildren’s wingLobbyOfficeSouth walk
Fictional layout, not to scale.

Threat context

CISA treats targeted violence at houses of worship as a real concern and recommends layers of protection, clear roles and practiced plans.

Source: CISA houses of worship security guide

Threat scenarios

The review asks how someone could walk in uninvited, force an entry, or reach people before a warning does.

For a real church, this section adds the site's own history, local threat information and what church leaders and local responders tell us.

Risk grid

Score is likelihood times consequence, each rated 1 to 5. It sets the order of work.

Consequence

5
F07F08F10F12
F01F02F09
4
F04F11
F05
F03
3
F06
2
1
1
2
3
4
5
Likelihood
Every rating
IDLCScoreSeverity
F014520Urgent
F024520Urgent
F094520Urgent
F034416High
F073515High
F083515High
F103515High
F123515High
F053412High
F06339Moderate
F04248Moderate
F11248Moderate
Read the rating definitions

Likelihood

How easily someone could use the weakness as things stand.

  1. Very limited: several functioning controls must be bypassed.
  2. Limited: some independent controls remain.
  3. Plausible: a usable weakness remains with partial controls.
  4. Readily usable: a direct path has little effective control.
  5. Unrestricted: a direct path has no effective control.

Consequence

How bad the outcome could be if someone used it.

  1. Minor: limited local interruption.
  2. Low: short disruption with limited effects.
  3. Material: injury potential, loss of records or interrupted activities.
  4. Severe: serious injury potential or prolonged loss of activities.
  5. Critical: potential loss of life or harm to several people.

Urgent is 20 to 25, high is 12 to 19 and moderate is 1 to 11. Anything that affects getting people out safely gets reviewed right away, whatever its score.

The 12 findings

Open a finding to see what we saw, what could happen, what we recommend and how the church shows the work is done.

F01Entry stays openUrgent

Project P01L 4 × C 5 = 20

Plan location
Front entry
What we saw
The lobby door stays open once the greeter leaves the desk, and nobody checks that it closed.
Threat scenario
An unauthorized person could enter during a gathering.
What could happen
People in the lobby and worship hall could be exposed before volunteers can respond.
Recommended action
Define a staffed entry procedure and have a qualified provider scope controlled entry with free emergency exit.
Decision owner
Facilities lead
Closeout record
Record a door acceptance check and a staffed entry walkthrough.
F02Children’s door is sharedUrgent

Project P01L 4 × C 5 = 20

Plan location
Children’s wing
What we saw
The children's wing opens onto the public corridor through a shared door, with no set handoff point at pickup.
Threat scenario
An unauthorized visitor could reach children’s rooms.
What could happen
Children and volunteers could face direct harm; reunification could become harder.
Recommended action
Separate public access from child pickup. Scope a controlled door and a written handoff procedure.
Decision owner
Children’s ministry lead
Closeout record
Demonstrate authorized pickup, visitor redirection and emergency exit.
F03Service door has a gapHigh

Project P01L 4 × C 4 = 16

Plan location
Service yard
What we saw
The service door doesn't sit flush in its frame, and the latch check is marked incomplete.
Threat scenario
A person could bypass the main entry through the service route.
What could happen
Uncontrolled access could reach occupied rooms or damage supplies needed for church activities.
Recommended action
Have a qualified provider evaluate the door, frame and latch as one assembly.
Decision owner
Facilities lead
Closeout record
Retain a provider report showing secure closure and free emergency exit.
F04Boundary opens to lotModerate

Project P02L 2 × C 4 = 8

Plan location
West boundary
What we saw
A break in the west boundary lets people walk straight from the sidewalk into the parking lot. There's no set arrival route.
Threat scenario
An unauthorized approach could avoid the greeting point.
What could happen
Volunteers may have less time to recognize a concerning approach and warn people inside.
Recommended action
Scope a defined pedestrian route and perimeter controls that preserve accessible access and responder access.
Decision owner
Facilities lead
Closeout record
Walk the route with the provider and record accessible and emergency access checks.
F05Approach is unlitHigh

Project P02L 3 × C 4 = 12

Plan location
Parking approach
What we saw
On the evening walk, the path from the parking lot to the main entry has an unlit stretch. No light readings were taken.
Threat scenario
A concerning approach could be harder to see before it reaches the entry.
What could happen
People arriving or leaving could receive less warning of a threat.
Recommended action
Obtain a lighting survey and scope security lighting for the approach. Confirm coverage after dark.
Decision owner
Facilities lead
Closeout record
Keep the lighting design and an after-dark acceptance record.
F06Camera misses the walkModerate

Project P02L 3 × C 3 = 9

Plan location
South walk
What we saw
The camera view stops short of the south walk, so the approach to the lobby isn't covered.
Threat scenario
An unauthorized approach could occur outside the recorded view.
What could happen
Staff could miss useful context when deciding how to respond or preserving records afterward.
Recommended action
Have a qualified provider scope a camera view of the approach with privacy limits and a retention plan.
Decision owner
Facilities lead
Closeout record
Save a view check and verify access roles, time settings and retention.
F07Exit route is unclearHigh

Project P03L 3 × C 5 = 15

Plan location
West exit
What we saw
Movable storage sits beside the west exit, and volunteers haven't been briefed on a second way out.
Threat scenario
A targeted attack could make the main route unusable.
What could happen
People could be delayed while trying to reach a safe exit.
Recommended action
Clear the route as an immediate operating task. Scope any exit hardware work separately with qualified life safety review.
Decision owner
Facilities lead
Closeout record
Keep a clear-route check and verify compliant exit operation with the responsible provider.
F08Glazing is unreviewedHigh

Project P03L 3 × C 5 = 15

Plan location
Lobby glazing
What we saw
Nobody has documented how the lobby glass holds up to force, and it hasn't been tested.
Threat scenario
An attacker could try to force entry through glazing near the gathering area.
What could happen
Forced entry could expose people in the lobby and interrupt worship and community activities.
Recommended action
Obtain a professional review of the complete glazing and frame assembly before choosing any hardening work.
Decision owner
Facilities lead
Closeout record
Retain the approved assembly design and provider acceptance record.
F09Keys lack a registerUrgent

Project P01L 4 × C 5 = 20

Plan location
Office hall
What we saw
Shared keys hang in the key cabinet with no sign-out register or return check, and there's no list of who holds keys.
Threat scenario
A person with an untracked key could bypass a controlled door.
What could happen
Door improvements could leave an uncontrolled access path into occupied areas.
Recommended action
Create a key custody register. Have a qualified provider scope key control changes for affected doors.
Decision owner
Facilities lead
Closeout record
Reconcile authorized holders, retained keys and completed door checks.
F10Warnings stop at lobbyHigh

Project P04L 3 × C 5 = 15

Plan location
Worship hall
What we saw
Announcements go out from the lobby, but nothing confirms they reach the worship hall or the children's wing.
Threat scenario
A threat warning could fail to reach everyone who needs to act.
What could happen
People could act late or get conflicting directions, which puts them at more risk.
Recommended action
Scope an accessible notification method and test how warnings reach each occupied area.
Decision owner
Safety team lead
Closeout record
Document audibility, visible or other accessible warning needs and a room-by-room test.
F11Response roles are missingModerate

Project P05L 2 × C 4 = 8

Plan location
Office records
What we saw
The response sheet names no backup decision maker, no one to hand off to responders and no one to lead child reunification.
Threat scenario
A targeted threat could require several decisions at once.
What could happen
Unclear responsibilities could slow emergency calls, protective action and family reunification.
Recommended action
Develop a response plan with named roles, alternates and coordination with local responders.
Decision owner
Board chair
Closeout record
Approve the plan and keep a role assignment and responder coordination record.
F12Volunteers lack a drillHigh

Project P04L 3 × C 5 = 15

Plan location
Office training
What we saw
The training file shows no drill for a threat during worship, during child pickup or for an evacuation.
Threat scenario
Volunteers could face a targeted threat without practicing the agreed response.
What could happen
Inconsistent actions could delay warning, safe movement and accountability.
Recommended action
Arrange security training and a discussion exercise, then record corrective actions.
Decision owner
Safety team lead
Closeout record
Keep attendance, exercise notes, action owners and a follow-up review.

Recommended projects

Each project groups related findings under one of Texas's FY2026 grant cost categories.

P01

Control entry

F01 F02 F03 F09

Address uncontrolled doors and key custody together. The facilities lead scopes the hardware and the pastor approves how volunteers manage arrival.

NSGP cost category Equipment

Check the door design, accessible entry and emergency exit before buying anything. The key register and greeter routine are church tasks the grant doesn't cover.

P02

Review the approach

F04 F05 F06

Define the arrival route, assess the lighting and close the camera view gap. Keep responder access and privacy in the scope.

NSGP cost category Equipment

Confirm each item is allowed. Fixed perimeter work may count as construction, which needs approval first, and no work starts before the environmental review (EHP) clears.

P03

Review exits and glazing

F07 F08

Have qualified providers review door operation and the full glazing assembly. The church clears stored items from the exit route now.

NSGP cost category Equipment; Construction and Renovation

Construction and renovation need PSO and FEMA approval in advance.

P04

Practice warnings

F10 F12

Scope warnings that reach occupied rooms. Train volunteers and run a discussion exercise before testing the agreed procedures.

NSGP cost category Equipment; Training and Exercises

Budget the warning equipment apart from training and exercise costs, and confirm the warnings reach people who can't hear or see them.

P05

Write the response plan

F11

Assign response roles and alternates, plan reunification and coordinate the church’s procedures with local responders.

NSGP cost category Planning

Planning here means the response plan written after the award.

Before a real application

Confirm the current federal NOFO, equipment rules and state instructions. Develop a scoped budget and milestones. The church’s board approves the application and selects its providers independently.

The grant doesn't pay for this assessment, the Investment Justification, grant writing or other costs before the award.

Source: Texas FY2026 NSGP announcement

How the assessment works

The assessment feeds the threat, vulnerability, consequence and project sections of the church's Investment Justification (IJ) in its grant application.

On a real site walk

Review arrival, occupied rooms, exits and records with the pastor, facilities lead and safety team. Record evidence, confirm what was tested and keep unanswered questions open.

We assess and recommend. We don't sell or install equipment, monitor alarms or provide guard service, so the church picks its own providers.

Sources

Sources checked October 20, 2026.

Fictional sample. No real client, site or incident.

Call 3P · (469) 754-8315